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CIVIL RIGHTS AND MORTGAGE LENDING DISCRIMINATION:
ESTABLISHING A PRIMA FACIE CASE UNDER THE DISPARATE
TREATMENT THEORY

G. Carol Brani'
I. INTRODUCTION
The disincentives to pursue mortgage
lending discrimination claims have rarely
been more clear than in the Latimore v.
Citibank Federal Savings Bank9 decision, a
1998 fair-lending case heard by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit. Helen Latimore, a creditworthy black
applicant, alleged that Citibank Federal
Savings Bank discriminated against her in
violation ofboth the Equal Credit Opportunity
Act ("ECOA") 3 and the Fair Housing Act
("FHA")4 in its denial of her home loan
application.5 Citibank's denial followed an

' Candidate for Juris Doctor, Washington and Lee
University School of Law, May 2000.
2 Latimore v. Citibank Fed. Say. Bank, 151 F.3d 712
(7th Cir. 1998).
3 Equal Credit Opportunity
Act, Pub. L. No. 93-495,88
Stat. 1500, 1521-25 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1691-1691f (1994 & Supp.1 1997).
Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub.L.No.

4

90-284, § 805, 82 Stat. 73, 81-89 (1968) (commonly
known as the Fair Housing Act) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 3601-3619 (1994 & Supp. II 1996)). For a
discussion of subsequent amendments, see Robert G.
Boehmer, Mortgage Discrimination:Paperwork and
Prohibitions Prove Insufficient -- Is It Time for
Simplification and Incentives? 21 HOFSTRA L. REv.
603, 607 & n.18 (1993) (hereinafter Boehner).
5
Latimore, 151 F.3d at 713.Citibank denied Latimore's

$51,000 mortgage loan application. Id. She had applied
for a loan to be secured by her home. Id. "The bank's
appraiser.., appraised the property at only $45,000."
Id. Within months she applied for a loan from another
lending institution. Id. At that time her residence was
appraised at $79,000, and the bank approved her for a
$46,000 loan. Id. She paid a 1% higher rate than she
had sought from Citibank. Id. In preparation for this

alleged under-appraisal of the value of her
residence, located in a predominately minority
neighborhood. 6 Latimore appealed the district
court's grant of summary judgment to the
defendants.7
Judge Posner surprised both parties'
counsel by declining to apply the McDonnell
Douglasv. Green 8 burden-shifting framework
in Latimore. He acknowledged that the Fifth
and Eighth Circuits implemented McDonnell

litigation, Latimore commissioned a "retrospective
appraisal, that is an appraisal of the value of her home
at the time that Citibank appraised it." Id. at 715. The
appraiser valued her home at $62,000. Id.
Nevertheless, the court concluded that "no reasonable
jury could find that [Latimore] was turned down
because of her race." Id. at 716.
6 Latimore's property is located in a neighborhood that
has a more than ninety per cent black population.
Latimore v. Citibank F.S.B., 979 F. Supp. 663 (N.D.
Ill. 1997).
7
Latimore, 151 F.3d at 713.
8 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
802-04 (1973). In United States v. Badgett, the court
summarized the burden-shifting standard as follows:
"'First, the plaintiff has the burden of proving a prima
facie case of discrimination by a preponderance of the
evidence. Second, if the plaintiff sufficiently
establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the
defendant to articulate some legitimate
undiscriminatory [sic] reason for its action. Third, ifthe
defendant satisfies this burden, the plaintiff has the
opportunity to prove by a preponderance that the
legitimate reasons asserted by the defendant are in fact
mere pretext."' United States v. Badgett, 976 F.2d
1176, 1178 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Pollitt v. Bramel,
669 F. Supp. 172, 175 (S.D. Ohio 1987) (citations
omitted)). Also, "[t]he McDonnell Douglas test
recognizes that direct proof of unlawful discrimination
is rarely available. Therefore, after a plaintiff makes a
prima facie case, a presumption of illegality arises and
respondent has the burden of articulating a legitimate,
non-discriminatory justification for the challenged
policy." Id.

Douglas in mortgage lending discrimination
cases.9 However, Posner found McDonnell
Douglas inapplicable to credit discrimination
cases because the mortgage loan application
process lacks the "competitive situation" that
exists between black and white job applicants
in the employment discrimination context.'0
"[W]holesale transposition of the McDonnell
Douglas standard to the credit discrimination
context would display insensitivity to the
thinking behind the standard."" Posner thus
left the burden on Latimore to prove her case
of discrimination the "conventional way,"
"without relying on any special doctrines of
burden-shifting." 2
Nonetheless, the Department of Housing
and Urban Development ("HUD") has
adopted the McDonnell Douglas formulation
"for evaluating claims of discrimination under
the Fair Housing Act."' 3 Further, courts
generally have imported Title VII' 4
employment discrimination theories and
burden-shifting schemes to mortgage lending
discrimination litigation. 5 No United States

9

Latimore, 151 F.3d at 714 (referring to Sinims v. First
Gibraltar Bank, 83 F.3d 1546, 1558 (5th Cir. (1996);
Moore v. USDA, 55 F.3d 991,995 (5th Cir. 1995); and
Ring v. First Interstate Mortgage, Inc., 984 F.2d 924,

Supreme Court decision binds them, and the
case law in this context is scant. Therefore,
courts are without interpretive guidance.
Creditors remain without nationwide
standards as to which lending practices may
render them vulnerable to allegations of
Finally, fair
discriminatory treatment.
housing advocacy groups and the plaintiffs'
bar cannot accurately assess which mortgage
lending discrimination claims are worthwhile,
that is, those likely to succeed.
It is not surprising that attorneys on both
sides of the aisle in Latimore argued under the
assumption that the McDonnell Douglas
standard would be imposed in the context of a
mortgage lending discrimination claim.16 In
an earlier fair housing case, Judge Posner
repeatedly analogized Title VIII cases to Title
VII disparate treatment cases and stated that
"[p]laintiffs in can use a method of proof
similar to that which the Supreme Court in
McDonnell Douglas... created for disparate
treatment cases brought under Title VII. ' 7
Moreover, the following excerpt from a
Senate report suggests that Congress intended
the importation ofemployment discrimination
standards and theories to the analysis of
ECOA claims:
In determining the existence of
discrimination on
[prohibited] grounds,
courts or agencies are free to
look at the effects of a
creditor's practices as well as
the creditor's motives or
conduct in individual
transactions. Thus, judicial
constructions of anti-

926 (8th Cir. 1993)).
'oLatimore, 151 F.3d at 714.

"Id.

12Id.at
13

715.
Badgett, 976 F.2d at 1178 (referring to HUD v.

Blackwell, 908 F.2d 864 (1 lth Cir. 1990)); Pinchback

v.Armistead Homes Corp., 689 F. Supp. 541 (D. Md.
1988), affd in part, vacated in part, 907 F.2d. 1447

(4th Cir. 1990)).
14Tire VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No.
88-352, tit. VII, 78 Stat. 241,253-266 (1964) (codified

as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1994,

Supp. II 1996 & West Supp. 1998).
"5 See, e.g., Williams v. The 5300 Columbia Pike Corp.,
891 F. Supp. 1169, 1178-80 (E.D. Va. 1995); Pfaffv.
HUD, 88 F.3d 739,745 & n.1 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring
to Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington,
844 F.2d 926, 934-35 (2d Cir.), affd, 488 U.S. 15

(1988)).

'6 Latimore, 151 F.3d at 714.
Village of Bellwood v. Dwivedi, 895 F.2d 1521,
1529-31(7th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted) (referring to
Phillips v. Hunter Trails Community Ass'n, 685 F.2d
184, 190 (7th Cir. 1982)).
'7

discrimination legislation in
the employment field, in cases
such as Griggsv. Duke Power
Company, and Albemarle
PaperCompanyv. Moody, are
intended to serve as guides in
the application of this Act,
especially with respect to the
allocations of burdens of
8
proof.
The Latimore decision should alert Congress
that the FHA and ECOA prohibitions as to
residential lending discrimination protect no
classes of persons if inconsistent proof
standards discourage private enforcement.
This Article examines the prima facie
case of credit discrimination under disparate
treatment analysis, specifically focusing on
redlining 9 and under-appraisal2" claims
against mortgage lending institutions. Part II
of this Article provides a general overview of
legislative efforts to provide equal access to
mortgage financing. Parts III and IV discuss
and contrast the FHA and ECOA
requirements, and explain the standards and
terms that have been imported from Title VII
to Title VIII litigation. Finally, Part V
discusses decisions in which courts have
applied Title VII standards to disparate
treatment claims in the context of redlining
and under-appraisals of property in
predominately black neighborhoods.
II. BACKGROUND
Equal access to housing continues to be
an elusive goal. Following the end of slavery

in 1865, "racially restrictive covenants,"
"segregation laws," and "nationalized racially
discriminatory home mortgage underwriting
criteria" effectively prevented blacks from
achieving home ownership. 2 Once these
obstacles were removed, it became apparent
that racial discrimination in home mortgage
financing remained a formidable factor
hindering the efforts of blacks to purchase
residences.22 Not until the 1960's did the
federal government take action to encourage
black home ownership and to abolish housing
discrimination.23
Congress first addressed race as a factor
inhibiting home mortgage lending with the
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1968,24
commonly referred to as the Fair Housing Act,
and the amendment of the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act 25 to prohibit racial
discrimination in the granting of credit. Both
enactments had broader purposes than the
elimination of discrimination in mortgage
transactions.26 The significance of these laws
in the achievement of fair lending practices
was that they provided individual home
purchasers with private claims for
discrimination in the denial of
home
mortgage loans for residential purchases.
Many private defendants routinely join FHA

21

Stephen M. Dane, Eliminating the Labyrinth: A

Proposal to Simplify Federal Mortgage Lending
DiscriminationLaws, 26 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM. 527,

528 (1993).
Id. at 530.
2 Id. at 528-29.
24 Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No.. 90-284, tit.
VIII, 82 Stat. 73, 81-89 (codified as amended at 42
22

U.S.C. § § 3601-3619 (1994 & Supp. 111996)).
2' Pub. L. No. 93-495, tit. V, 88 Stat. 1500, 1521-25

" Evans v. First Fed. Say. Bank, 669 F. Supp. 915, 922
n.3 (N.D. Ind. 1987) (quoting S.REP. No. 94-589, at 45 (1976)) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
9 See infra notes 109 through 134
and accompanying
text.
20

See infra notes 135 through 162 and accompanying

text.

(1974) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 16911691f (1994 & Supp. 1996)). The ECOA had as its
original purpose the eradication of discrimination
against married women in lending, and was only later
amended to prohibit racially motivated credit
discrimination.
Id.
26 Dane, supra note 21, at 528 n.1.

and ECOA claims in any case against a
"creditor." 27
Although federal enforcement has been
aggressive in fighting racial discrimination in
the sale and rental of housing, it has been
noticeably lacking in the fight against home
lending discrimination.28
Consequently,
private action has tended to be the only action
enforcing the federal laws against credit
discrimination on the basis of race. However,
discrimination in the mortgage lending area is
neither as transparent nor as identifiable as it
may be in rental and sales of residences, thus
hindering effective private action.29
Mortgage lending discrimination
generally takes one of two forms: (1) denial of
a home mortgage to a minority loan applicant
because of his race,3" and (2) denial of
financing for the purchase or improvement of
a residence located in a predominately
minority or mixed-race neighborhood.3 '
"[U]nder the FHA and the ECOA, the plaintiff
'must show that "race was a motivating
consideration in the [defendants'] decision"
not to make the loan.' ' 32 She may support her

27
2'

Id. See infra note 74 and accompanying text.
Dane, supra note 21, at 532.

29Id.
30

claim with direct evidence of discrimination.33
Two other theories of liability are available
under either statute: (1) "disparate treatment,"
where indirect evidence supports an inference
of discriminatory intent, and (2) "disparate
impact," which originated with Griggs v.
Duke Power.3 4 Generally, a plaintiff alleging
disparate impact must identify a specific
practice which produces a discriminatory
effect that is significant enough to merit
finding the defendant(s) liable to the
plaintiff(s).35 "The accumulated.., case law
-- particularly the more recent case law --

suggests that many courts, while not requiring
an overt finding of intent to discriminate,
implicitly incorporate such a requirement or
its functional equivalent in their application of
the disparate impact standard."36
Despite two decades of sporadic
litigation, the proof requirements of a prima
facie case in the mortgage lending context
remain unclear.37 Understanding the
significance ofthe Seventh Circuit's refusal to
apply the McDonnellDouglasburden-shifting
framework in Latimore initially requires an
examination of the statutes upon which
Latimore's claims were based.
III. THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK OF
FAIR LENDING/HOUSING ACTS

See, e.g., Buycks-Roberson v. Citibank Fed. Sav.

Bank, 162 F.R.D. 322, 326-27 & n.6 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
Plaintiffs represented a class alleging racial
discrimination in the denial of a mortgage loan. Id.
Calvin Roberson represented "a class of plaintiffs
consisting of African-Americans who were denied
home loans during the class period, not class members
who were African-American and lived in
predominantly African-American neighborhoods." Id.
at 326 n.6.
31See, e.g., Latimore, 151 F.3d at 712.
32
Latimore, 979 F. Supp. at 664 (quoting Thomas v.
First Fed. Say. Bank, 653 F. Supp. 1330, 1338-39
(N.D. Ind. 1987) (quoting Kaplan v. 442 Wellington
Coop. Bldg. Corp., 567 F. Supp. 53, 57 (N.D. Ill.
1983)); Saldana v. Citibank Fed. Say. Bank, No. 93 C
4164, 1996 WL 332451, at *2 (N.D. Ill. June 13,
1996).

A. FairHousingAct
The Fair Housing Act has as its goal

33Saldana,

1996 WL 332451, at *2.
401 U.S. 424 (1971).
" Williams, 891 F. Supp. at 1178 (citing Hanson v.
Veterans Admin., 800 F.2d 1381, 1386 (5th Cir. 1986),
and Halet v. Wend Inv. Co., 672 F.2d 1305, 1311 (9th
Cir. 1982)).
36 Peter E. Mahoney, The End(s) ofDisparateImpact:
DoctrinalReconstruction,FairHousing,and Lending
Law, and the AntidiscriminationPrinciple,47 EMORY
L.J.
409, 420 (1998) (hereinafter Mahoney).
37
See generally id.
34

the provision of fair housing.38 Originally, the
FHA banned discrimination in the sale, rental,
and financing of housing on the basis of"race,
color, religion, or national origin."'3 9
Subsequently, Congress amended the statute
to add gender, handicap and familial status to
the protected categories.4" The provisions of
the FHA bar such discrimination by private as
well as public parties.4 Section 3605(a)
prohibits

person 42

a

or

entity

from

discriminating against a member of one of the
protected categories in the "terms or
"residential real estateconditions" of
3
4
'
transactions."

repairing, or maintaining a dwelling; ... or
44
secured by residential real estate.
Appraisals, sales and brokering of residences
45
are also included in the statutory definition.
All aspects of the "mortgage loan and
approval process arguably are covered"
transactions under the FHA definition, as well
as loans for home improvements and repairs.46
The FHA prohibitions also apply to any
borrowing with residential real estate as the
underlying collateral, including home equity
loans used for purposes unrelated to the
secured property.47
2. Steering

1. ResidentialReal Estate-Related
Transactions
Section 3605(b)(1) of the FHA defines
"residential real estate-related transactions" to
include "the making or purchasing of loans or
providing other financial assistance ... for
purchasing, constructing, improving,

38
39

42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
See infra note 4.

Section 804(a) of the FHA both
defines and prohibits "steering. '4 It is
unlawful to "make unavailable or deny.. a
dwelling to any person because ofrace. ' , 49 The
seminal case is Village of Bellwood v.
Dwivedi, in which Raj Realty allegedly
"encourag[ed] blacks to buy in Bellwood and
whites to buy in" white suburbs."0 Defendants
appealed a judgment against them for
"compensatory damages, attorneys' fees...
and an injunction."'" Judge Posner, writing for

40 Fair Housing Amendments

Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-430, § 6, 102 Stat. 1619, 1620, 1622 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1994)). The Act was
amended to prohibit gender-based discrimination in
1974. In 1988, Congress further amended the Act to
prohibit discrimination on the basis of handicap or
familial status. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1994). The Housing
for Older Persons Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-76, §§
2,3, 109 Stat. 787 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)),
also amending the Fair Housing Act, is not relevant to
the discussion of this article.
41 United States v. Henshaw Bros., Inc., 401 F. Supp.
399, 402 (E.D. Va. 1974) (referring to United States v.
Hunter, 459 F.2d 205 (4th Cir. 1972)).
4242 U.S.C. § 3602(d) (1994), defines "person" as "one
or more individuals, corporations, partnerships,
associations, labor organizations, legal representatives,
mutual companies, joint-stock companies, trusts,
unincorporated organizations, trustees, trustees in cases
under Title 11 .

. . ,

receivers, and fiduciaries." 42

U.S.C. § 3602(d) (1994).
43 42 U.S.C. § 3605(a) (1994).

U.S.C. § 3602(b) (1994). This section provides
the definition of "dwelling" as follows: "any building,
structure, or portion thereof which is occupied as, or
designed or intended for occupancy as, a residence by
one or more families, and any vacant land which is
offered for sale or lease for the construction or location
thereon of any such building, structure, or portion
thereof." Id.
4 42 U.S.C. § 3605(b)(2) (1994).
4442

46
47

Dane, supra note 21, at 541.
1d.

42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (1994). This section deems it
unlawful "to refuse to sell or rent after the making of a
bona fide offer or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or
rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a
dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion,
sex, familial status, or national origin." Id.
48

49

1d.
5 Village ofBellwood, 895 F.2d at 1525.
51Id.

reason (such as customer
preference) for this pattern,
then an inference of disparate
treatment can be drawn from
the discriminatory effect. 13

the court, explained the manner in which
steering violates the FHA:
Suppose a real estate broker
falsely states to a black
customer that no homes are for
sale in Village X, which is
primarily white, and he does
so because the customer is
black, so that the statement is
a deliberate, racially motivated
falsity. By doing this he denies
a dwelling to a person because
of the person's race (§
3604(a)), discriminates on
racial grounds against the
person in the provision of real
estate services (§ 3604(b)),
and misrepresents to the
person on racial grounds that a
dwelling is not for sale (§
3604(d)). He is acting
intentionally to prevent a black
from buying a house in a white
neighborhood. . . . This is
deliberate conduct, and
unquestionably it is racial
2
steering.1

Moreover, the court noted that none of Raj
Realty's "genuine customers" were plaintiffs.54

3. Enforcement
Private persons may bring claims of
lending discrimination against developers,55
building and land contractors,56 banks,
financial institutions and mortgage lenders.57
Courts also have allowed claims to be brought
under the FHA against secondary market
purchasers ofmortgage loans. 8 The secondary
market is the market of resale of signed
borrowers' notes in which such notes are
bought, sold, assigned and transferred to third
parties uninvolved in the original loan
transaction.
Individuals who have been
"aggrieved" 59 by mortgage lending

The court reversed the judgment and granted
Raj Realty a new trial, holding that:
53

(1) a real estate broker who
treats customers differently
from one another because of
their race violates Title VIII;
(2) even without direct
evidence of such difference in
treatment, if the broker sells
blacks houses in black
neighborhoods and whites
houses in white ones and he
can offer no noninvidious
52

Id. at 1529.

1d. at 1533-34.

54

Id. at 1532. The plaintiffs were testers. Id.
"See generallyLove v. DeCarlo Homes, Inc., 482 F.2d
613 (5th Cir. 1973).

" See generallyClark v. Universal Builders, Inc., 501
F.2d 324 (7th Cir. 1974).
" See generally Evans v. First Fed. Say. Bank, 669 F.
Supp. 915 (N.D. Ind. 1987).
58
See generally Ring v. First Interstate Mortgage, Inc.,
984 F.2d 924 (8th Cir. 1993).
" Dane, supra note 21, at 543 & n.72. "The term
'aggrieved' has been interpreted by the Supreme Court
to include any person who would have standing under

the constitutional case or controversy standard. See
Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 37273 (1982); Gladstone Realtors v. City of Bellwood,
441 U.S. 91, 103 (1979), Trafficante v. Metropolitan

discrimination have two options under the
FHA: (1) "fil[ing] an administrative complaint
with HUD, ''61 or (2) "initiat[ing] a civil action
in federal or state court."61 The applicable
statute of limitations is "[two] years after the
occurrence or the termination of an alleged
discriminatory housing practice. 6 2 Section
3613 provides for the following remedies to
individuals in civil proceedings: "actual and
punitive damages," "permanent or temporary"
injunctive relief, and a "reasonable attorney's
63
fee and costs."
The FHA assigns to the Department of
Housing and Urban Development ("HUD")
primary responsibility for implementation and
enforcement of FHA requirements. 64 HUD
conducts investigations and administrative
proceedings on discrimination claims.65 In
addition, other federal departments and
agencies have promulgated regulations
relevant to mortgage lending as part of their
administration of programs
related to
financial institutions.66 Generally, both HUD
and the courts have construed the language of
the FHA broadly in order to provide relief to
parties who have experienced mortgagelending discrimination.67 Both the Attorney

Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 208 (1972) ' Id.
60
Dane, supranote 21, at 543.
61 Id.

62
63
64

42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(A) (1994).
42 U.S.C. § 3613(c) (1994).
42 U.S.C. §§ 3608-3612 (1994 & Supp. II 1996).

Specifically, administrative enforcement powers are
given to HUD under § 3610. HUD regulations
implementing FHA mortgage lending prohibitions are
found
at 24 C.F.R. § 100 (1998).
65
See 42 U.S.C. § 3610 (1994).
66 See 12 C.F.R. §§ 27, 338, 528, 701.31 (1998).
Programs and activities related to the regulation of
housing are administered by the Comptroller of the
Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,
the Office of Thrift Supervision and the National Credit
Union Administration. Id.
67 Stacldouse
v. De Sitter, 620 F. Supp. 208,210 (N.D.
Ill. 1985).

General and private persons may also enforce
the FHA.68
B. Equal Credit OpportunityAct
In 1974, the Consumer Credit
Protection Act69 was amended to include what
is commonly known as the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act.7" The ECOA originally
protected consumers from discrimination in
consumer credit transactions on the basis of
gender or marital status. Not until 1976 did
Congress expand the scope of the ECOA to
prohibit racial discrimination in the same
context.7' While the FHA's application to
credit transactions is limited to loans for
housing or those secured by real estate, the
ECOA encompasses all consumer credit
transactions regardless of whether they are
related to home ownership.72 The statute's
prohibitions apply to "any aspect of a credit
transaction," from initial intake to closing,
and, arguably, foreclosure.73 The definition of

68 42 U.S.C. § 3614

(1994). The Attorney General may

initiate claims against persons "engaged in a pattern or
practice of resistance to the full enjoyment of any of
the rights granted by" the FHA. Under § 3613(e), the
Attorney General "may intervene in... [a] civil action"

following certification that "the case is of general
public importance." 42 U.S.C. § 3613(e) (1994). HUD

may also refer civil actions to the Attorney General for
subsequent legal action. 42 U.S.C. § 3614(b) (1994).
Notably, the ECOA "authorizes the Attorney General

to seek a wide range of equitable remedies, but not
legal money damages ..... United States v. Beneficial
Corp., 492 F. Supp. 682, 688 (D. N.J. 1980), af'd, 673

F.2d 1302 (1981) (unpublished).
69 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1693r (1994 & Supp. III 1997).

"See infra note 3.
71

Pub. L. No. 94-239, 90 Stat. 251 (codified as

amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (1994 &Supp. 1111997).

Other prohibited bases included in the ECOA as
amended: national origin, religion, age, and receipt of
income from a public assistance program. Id.
7

See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 3605(a) (1994); 15 U.S.C. §§

1691(a), 1691a(d) (1994).
73

15 U.S.C. § 1691(a) (1994).

"creditor" includes not only persons who
"regularly extend[ ], renew[ ],or continue[ ]
credit," but also includes "assignee[s] of an
original creditor."'74 Thus, for purposes of the
ECOA, a buyer of home mortgage loans on
the secondary market is a "creditor" if she
participates in the approval or rejection of a
credit application.7"
1. Regulatory Scheme
The Federal Reserve Board has
promulgated Regulation B, a comprehensive
implementing provision under the ECOA.76 It

" 15 U.S.C. § 1691a(e) provides in relevant part: "The
term 'creditor' means any person who regularly
extends, renews, or continues credit; any person who
regularly arranges for the extension, renewal, or
continuation of credit; or any assignee of an original
creditor who participates in the decision to extend,
renew, or continue credit." 15 U.S.C. §
1691a(e)(1994).
15 U.S.C. § 1691a defines "person' as: "a natural
person, a corporation, government or governmental
subdivision or agency, trust, estate, partnership,
cooperative or association." 15 U.S.C. § 1691a (f)
(1994).
Regulation B provides further guidance for
defining the term: "Creditor means a person who, in the
ordinary course of business, regularly participates in
the decision of whether or not to extend credit. The
term includes a creditor's assignee, transferee, or
subrogee who so participates. [The term in certain
instances] also includes a person who, in the ordinary
course of business, regularly refers applicants or
prospective applicants to creditors, or selects or offers
to select creditors to whom requests for credit may be
made." 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(1) (1999).
7'Dane, supranote 21, at 547.
76 Regulation B, 12 C.F.R. § 202 (1999). While the
Federal Reserve Board has promulgated the most
significant regulation implementing ECOA provisions,
the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") is the "default"
enforcement agency of ECOA provisions. 15 U.S.C. §
169 lc(c) (1994). Further, at least nine federal agencies
are tasked with oversight of various institutions
engaging in consumer credit lending. 15 U.S.C. §
1691c(a)1-9 (1994 & Supp. III 1997). For further
discussion of Regulation B's breadth, see Dane, supra

provides that the ECOA applies to all methods
of determining creditworthiness, whether
objective or subjective." Real estate agents
and "secondary market participants who are
not involved in" the creditor's loan rejection
decision are not within the scope of the
statute's prohibitions.78
Further, Regulation B prohibits
prescreening ifit is motivated by the ethnicity
of the consumer.79 "Prescreening" is a form of
steering in which a lender avoids transacting
business with a mortgage loan consumer by
discouraging him from submitting or pursuing
a loan application or encouraging that
consumer to apply at another lending
institution.8 Prescreening may be implicated
by the disproportionate percentage of black
homeowners obtaining residential mortgages
through subprime lenders.8
2. Notice
The most significant difference
between the ECOA and the FHA from a
practitioner's viewpoint is the ECOA notice
requirement.82 Section 1691(d) of the ECOA

note 21, at 557 & n.146.
"Regulation B, 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(p), (t) (1999).
"Dane, supranote 21, at 548 (referring to Markham
v. Colonial Mortgage Serv. Co., 605 F.2d 566, 571
(D.C. Cir. 1979)).
7912 C.F.R. § 202.5(a) (1999). See also 12 C.F.R. §
(1998).
528.3
8
oDane, supra note 21, at 537 n.37.
8'See infra at notes 167-77 for recent statistics on the
rate of black consumers acquiring home loans through
subprime lending.
82 See Regulation B, 12 C.F.R. § 202.9 (1999) for
notification requirements. See also Dane, supra note
21, at 548 & n.90 (cases focused specifically on
violations of the ECOA's notice requirements):
"Jochum v. Pico Credit Corp. of Westbank, Inc., 730
F.2d 1041, 1046-48 (5th Cir. 1984) (finding that a
creditor who refuses to fund a pending loan application
must supply written notification of the reasons for the
refusal); Fischl v. GMAC, 708 F.2d 143, 148 (5th Cir.
1983) (finding notice to be insufficient because it 'was

requires the creditor to notify a credit
applicant of its decision within thirty days
after receipt of a completed credit
application.83 Further, the creditor must
provide any rejected credit applicant with "the
specific reasons for the adverse action
taken."84 Although this explanation may be
provided either in oral or in written form, the
statute requires a creditor to advise the
applicant of his right to a written statement of
the reasons for denial upon request.8" It is this
affirmative duty which provides the applicant
with the creditor's explanation for disapproval
of her application.86 Moreover, section
1691(e) requires that, upon the request of the
applicant, creditors must provide the loan
applicant with a "copy of the appraisal report
used in connection with" the mortgage loan
application.87

3. Standing
Standing is considerably broader under
the FHA than under the ECOA. Congress
intended standing under the FHA to be as
broad as Article III permits.88 Consequently,
"courts are without authority to apply their
self-imposed restrictions on standing in such
suits."8 9 Where "the FHA protects 'any person
who claims to have been injured by a
discriminatory housing
practice,' the
ECOA... does not employ such broad terms,
it refers specifically to 'applicants,' and only
'applicants.""'9 Courts generally have viewed
the ECOA as protecting only those who apply
for credit.9 Thus, ECOA claims brought by
community fair housing organizations are
vulnerable to dismissal for lack of standing. 92
88

Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insur. Co., 409 U.S.

205,209 (1972); Hanson v. Veterans Admin., 800 F.2d
1381, 1384 (5th Cir. 1986). As to testers, under Havens
misleading, or at best excessively vague'); High v.
McLean Fin. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 1561, 1564 (D. D.C.
1987) (stating that every creditor rendering an adverse
decision must give notice); Sayers v. GMAC, 522 F.
Supp. 835, 841-42 (W.D. Mo. 1981) (imposing
punitive damages for the failure to give notice). See
generallyDavid J. Olivieri, Annotation, Notificationof
Adverse Action on Credit Application Under Equal
CreditOpportunityAct(15 US.C. §§ 1691 etseq.) and
RegulationsPromulgatedThereunder (12 C.F.R. Part
202), 65 A.L.R. Fed. 906 (1983)." Id.
83 15 U.S.C. § 1691(d)(1) (1994).
84 15 U.S.C. § 1691(d)(3) (1994).
85 15 U.S.C. § 169 1(d)(2), (3) (1994).
86 John L. Culhane, Jr., The Eye of the Beholder:
Developments Under the Equal CreditOpportunityAct
and Regulation B, 46 Bus. LAW 1069 (1991).
87 15 U.S.C. § 1691(e) (1994). The ECOA was
amended in 1991 to include subsection (e), which
provides inrelevantpart: "Each creditor shall promptly
furnish an applicant, upon written request by the
applicant made within a reasonable period of time of
the application, a copy of the appraisal report used in
connection with the applicant's application for a loan
that is or would have been secured by a lien on
residential real property. The creditor may require the
applicant to reimburse the creditor for the cost of the
appraisal." Id.

Realty Corp., a "tester to whom a real estate agent
makes a misrepresentation forbidden by 3604(d) has
standing to complain about the misrepresentation,
because the statute creates a right to be free from such
misrepresentations." Village of Bellwood, 895 F.2d at
1526 (referring to Havens Realty v. Coleman, 455 U.S.

363, 374 (1982)).
89

Hanson, 800 F.2d at 1384.

oEvans v. First Fed. Say. Bank, 669 F. Supp. 915, 923
& n.3 (N.D. Ind. 1987).
91See generally
id.; Cragin v. First Fed. Say. and Loan
Ass'n, 498 F. Supp. 379, 384 (D. Nev. 1980). See also
Dane, supra note 21, at 549 & n.96.
92

See, e.g., Evans, 669 F. Supp. at 922. The Evans

court dismissed the ECOA claim of the Northwest
Indiana Open Housing Center Inc. for lack of standing
to bring a claim under the statute. The Village of
Bellwood court discusses agency standing under the
FHA and concludes that "Havensmakes clear.., that
the only injury which need be shown to confer standing
on a fair-housing agency is deflection of the agency's
time and money from counseling to legal efforts
directed against discrimination. These are opportunity
costs of discrimination, since although the counseling
is not impaired directly there would be more of it were
it not for the defendant's discrimination." Village of
Bellwood, 895 F.2dat 1526 (citing Haynes Realty, 455

U.S. at 471-75).

IV.

[o]nce the plaintiff makes a
prima facie showing, the
defendant bears the burden of
rebutting the plaintiffs case.
While defendants are entitled
merely to rebut a plaintiffs
primafacie evidence,.., they
rarely rest their defense
exclusively on such grounds.
Defendants typically also
attempt to show that the
challenged practice is jobrelated and consistent with
business necessity.98

TITLE VII EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS AND
STANDARDS

Generally, courts have looked to Title
VII employment discriminationjurisprudence
for guidance in deciding Title VIII housing
discrimination claims.93 Consequently, any
examination of mortgage lending claims must
commence with an overview of Title VII law.
If a plaintiff provides direct evidence that an
employment decision was made on a
prohibited basis, e.g., race or gender, she will
have established a prima facie case that the
employer violated Title VII.94 Alternatively,
plaintiffs support their claims by showing
either "indirect evidence which establishes an
inference of discrimination"95 or evidence
indicating that a neutral policy has a
disproportionately adverse impact on a class
of persons that come under the statutory
protections.96
The disparate treatment doctrine
permits the inference of intentional
discrimination from proof of circumstantial
and indirect evidence of discrimination.97
Under the McDonnell Douglas burdenshifting framework,

In Griggsv. Duke Power Company,9 9
a unanimous Supreme Court interpreted the
language of Title VII" ' to mean that
"practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their
face, and even neutral in terms of intent,
cannot be maintained if they operate to
'freeze' the status quo of discriminatory
employment practices." 10' The resulting

98

Mahoney, supra note 36, at 424 (citations omitted).
9 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430

(1971).
" Title VII provides in part:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an

11 Mountain Side Mobile Estates Partnership v.
Secretary of HUD, 56 F.3d 1243, 1250-51& n.7 (10th
Cir. 1995) (citing Honce v. Vigil, 1 F.3d 1085, 1088

(10th Cir. 1993)).
4McCarthy v. Kemper Life Ins. Co., 924 F.2d 683,

686 (7th Cir. 1991); Hunt v. City of Markham, No. 97
C 5620, 1999 WL 35332, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 12,
1999).
91 Powell v. City of Norfolk, Civ. Action No. 2:97-cv73, 1998 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 15915 at *6 (E.D. Va. Aug.
17, 1998). See also Notari v. Denver Water Dep't, 971
F.2d 585, 589 (10th Cir. 1992).
96

Peters v. Lieuallen, 693 F.2d 966, 968-69 (9th Cir.

792.

religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his
employees or applicants for employment

in any way which would deprive or tend
to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect

his status as an employee, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or

national origin.

1982).

97See generallyMcDonnellDouglasCorp., 411 U.S.

employer-(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge
any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color,

at

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994).
101Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430.

doctrine of disparate impact °2 has provided a
theory upon which a discrimination claim in
the absence of circumstantial evidence of
intentional discrimination may be based. 3

"o2Such a claim is within the amendments in the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, § 3(3), Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105
Stat. 1071, 1074 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(k)(1)(A) (1999)). The statute provides in part:
An unlawful employment practice based
on disparate impact is established under
this title only if-(i) a complaining party demonstrates that
a respondent uses a particular employment
practice that causes a disparate impact on
the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin and the respondent fails to
demonstrate that the challenged practice is
job related for the position in question and
consistent with business necessity; or
(B) (i) With respect to demonstrating that
a particular employment practice causes a
disparate impact as described in
subparagraph (A)(i), the complaining
party shall demonstrate that each
particular challenged employmentpractice
causes a disparate impact, except that if
the complaining party can demonstrate to
the court that the elements of a
respondent's decisionmaking process are
not capable of separation for analysis, the
decisionmaking process may be analyzed
as one employment practice.
(ii) If the respondent demonstrates that a
specific employment practice does not
cause the disparate impact, the respondent
shall not be required to demonstrate that
such practice is required by business
necessity.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A), (B) (1994).
103

Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977,

986-87 (1988) (plurality opinion). Justice O'Connor
summarized disparate impact doctrine in Watson: "In
certain cases, facially neutral employmentpractices that
have significant adverse effects on protected groups
have been held to violate [Title VII] without proof that
the employer adopted those practices with a
discriminatory intent." Id. The plurality opinion in

Under disparate impact analysis, a plaintiff
must plead and prove three elements to
establish a prima facie case: "identification,
impact, and causation."'0 4 Generally, "a
plaintiff must show that the facially neutral
practice had a significant discriminatory
impact."'0 5 If a practice which produced a
disproportionate impact against a protected
class is a "business necessity," it may be
permissible. 06 On the other hand, Title VII
prohibits not only those practices that are
unfair in form, but also those unfair in
Evidence of
administration. 10 7
disproportionate impact "is conventionally
proved by a statistical comparison of the
representation of the protected class in the
applicant pool with representation in the group
actually accepted from the pool.'08

V. APPLICATION OF TITLE VII CASE
LAW AND THEORIES TO MORTGAGE

Watson has been cited more than 1090 times, "nearly
always with approval and quite frequently for the
analysis contained in the plurality portion of the
opinion." Mahoney, supra note 36, at 422 & n.39. See,
e.g., EEOC v. Steamship Clerks Union, Local 1066,48
F.3d 594, 601 (1st Cir. 1995); Johnson v. Uncle Ben's
Inc., 965 F.2d 1363, 1367 (5th Cir. 1992); Shutt v.
Sandoz Crop Protection Corp., 944 F.2d 1431, 1433
(9th Cir. 1991); Lowe v. Commack Union Free School
Dist., 886 F.2d 1364, 1370 (2d Cir. 1989); NAACP v.
Town of E. Haven, 998 F. Supp. 176, 184 (D. Conn.
1998); Barnett v. Technology Int'l, Inc., 1 F. Supp.2d
572, 579 (E.D. Va. 1998); Finch v. Hercules Inc., 865
F. Supp. 1104, 1122 (D. Del. 1994).
104 Mahoney, supra note 36, at 423 (referring to
Steamship Clerks Union, Local 1066,48 F.3d at 601).
"o'See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 446 (1982)
(emphasis added). For a recent Fourth Circuit case
examining disparate impact analysis under Title VII,
see Barnett, 1 F. Supp.2d at 579-81.
10642 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (1994).
'07 Mahoney, supra note 36, at 421.
08
Saldana v. Citibank Fed. Say. Bank, 1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 8327, at *12-13 (N.D. Ill. June 12, 1996).

LENDING DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS
UNDER THE ECOA AND FHA
Having reviewed relevant employment
discrimination standards, an examination of
decisions in which courts have imported Title
VII standards in deciding ECOA and FHA
claims is appropriate. Recent claims in the
mortgage loan discrimination context have
tended to be based upon allegations of
redlining or under-appraisal of the would-be
borrower's residence.
A. Redlining
The term "redlining" refers to
"mortgage credit discrimination based on the
[racial composition] of the neighborhood
surrounding the would-be borrower's
dwelling."109 Neither the ECOA nor the FHA
explicitly includes or defines "redlining."" 0
Establishing a prima facie case of redlining is
somewhat different from other mortgage
lending discrimination claims, in that the
lending institution's alleged discrimination is
based on the racial character of a
neighborhood rather than the race of a loan
applicant.
In Doane v. National Westminster
Bank USA," the plaintiff was a white male
owner of a residence in Brooklyn, New
York."' He desired to sell his home located
in Bedford-Stuyvesant, then comprised of

92.56% black residents."' He contracted with
two creditworthy black mortgage loan
applicants to sell his home for $195,000. 14
The defendant lender, NatWest appraised the
house at $175,000, but said it would extend
the mortgage "ifplaintiff agreed to reduce the
purchase price to $185,000.""1 Although
Doane lowered the sale price on the residence,
as suggested, NatWest denied the mortgage
application. 6 An independent appraisal
commissioned by the plaintiff "estimated that
7
the value of the property... was $197,000."1
The court adopted a test from a factually
similar Ohio decision, Old West End
Association v. Buckeye FederalSavings and
Loan,"'1 and required that Doane establish his
prima facie case of mortgage lending
discrimination by proving that: (1) the
property was in a minority neighborhood; (2)
the buyer applied for and qualified for a loan
from the defendant lending institution; (3) an
independent appraisal showed that the house's
value equaled its sale price; and, that (4) the
defendant rejected the buyer's loan
application. 9 Ultimately, Doane withstood
12 0
the defendant's motion to dismiss.
The district court opinion in Latimore
illustrates the challenge plaintiffs face in
litigating mortgage lending discrimination
claims.' Because a relatively small body of
case law exists in this context, claimants
generally argue by analogy to Title VII case
H3Id.

Thomas v. First Fed. Sav. Bank, 653 F. Supp. 1330,
1337 (N.D. Ind. 1987) (quoting Town of Springfield v.
McCarren, 549 F. Supp. 1134, 1142 (D. Vt. 1982)). See
also Cartwright v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 880
F.2d 912, 922 (7th Cir. 1989).
"0National State Bank v. Long, 630 F.2d 981,986 (3d
Cir. 1980) (holding that "national banks are subject to
the provisions of a state antiredlining statute when
federal legislation has covered some, but not all, of the
field"). Id. at 982.
...
Doane v. National Westminster Bank USA, 938 F.
Supp.
149 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
1 2 Id. at 150.
109

114Id.

115 Id.
116Id.
117ZId.

"' Old West End Ass'n v. Buckeye Fed. Say. & Loan,
675 F. Supp. 1100, 1103 (N.D. Ohio 1987). See also
Steptoe v. Savings of Am., 800 F. Supp. 1542, 1546
(N.D. Ohio 1992) (referring to Old West End Ass'n,
675
F. Supp. at 1103).
"9 Doane, 938 F. Supp. at 152.
20
1 Id. at 153.
121 See generally Latimore v. Citibank F.S.B., 979 F.
Supp. 662 (N.D. Ill. 1997).

law. Alternatively, they advocate the adoption
of standards and tests from otherjurisdictions'
mortgage lending discrimination decisions.
However, the district court in Latimore
explicitly rejected the Old West End
Association test because "this particular
formulation... has not been used anywhere
besides the Northern District of Ohio." ' 2
Instead, the court adopted the elements of a
prima facie case under Title VII, requiring that
the plaintiff prove "(1) that she is a member
of a protected class, (2) that she applied for
and was qualified for a loan, (3) that the loan
was rejected despite her qualifications, and (4)
that the defendants continued to approve loans
for applicants with qualifications similar to
12 3
those of the plaintiff."'
This test, which is very similar to the
MCDonnellDouglas test, was also adopted
by the court in Saldana v. Citibank Federal
Savings Bank. 2 4 In Saldana, an Illinois
plaintiff alleged that the denial of her loan
application "for an acquisition and rehab
construction loan" resulted from a policy of
redlining in violation ofboth the FHA and the
ECOA. 2 1 Saldana argued unsuccessfully that
the fourth prong of the test was irrelevant to
redlining claims since the refusal to approve
or deny credit depends upon the racial
character of the neighborhood rather than "the

race of the applicant."' 2 6 The court found that
the fourth prong was "a necessary element to
prove redlining." 127 Specifically, a plaintiff
alleging redlining must prove that the
mortgage lender "continued to approve loans
for applicants with qualifications similar to
the plaintiffs."'2 8
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act'29 data
has proved extremely useful to both plaintiffs
and community housing groups seeking
evidence of redlining in minority
neighborhoods. 30 Since 1975, the Home
Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975
("HMDA"), 3 ' has required most lenders' 32 to
compile andmake publicly available'33 overall
approval and rejection rates as well as the
number and total dollar amount of loans
originated or purchased by that institution
during the previous fiscal year. However,
because lenders need not disclose the reasons
for loan rejections, at least one court has held
that "HMDA data, standing alone and without
additional evidence, [does] not prove a claim
134
of redlining."'
B. Appraisals
The importance of appraisals in the
12

6Saldana, 1996

WL 332451, at *3.

127Id.
28

Id.
12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2810 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
130Dane, supra note 21, at 550.
131 Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975, Pub. L.
1

'22Id.at 667.

129

"zId.at 664-65. The test originated in McDonnell
Douglas, 411 U.S. at 824. The McDonnell Douglas
formulation has been adopted by the following courts
in mortgage lending discrimination cases: Thomas, 653
F. Supp. at 1338; Gross v. Small Bus. Admin., 669 F.
Supp. 50, 53 (N.D.N.Y. 1987); Bell v. Mike Ford
Realty Co., 857 F. Supp. 1550, 1556 (S.D. Ala. 1994).
..Saldana v. Citibank Fed. Say. Bank, No. 93 C 4164,
1996 WL 332451, at *2 (N.D. Ill.
June 13, 1996)
125 Id. at * 1-3 (referring to Milton v. Bankplus
Mortgage Corp., No. 96 C 106, 1996 WL 197532, at*2
(N.D. Ill. April 19, 1996)). Saldana pursued her claim
under both disparate treatment and disparate impact
theories. Saldana, 1996 WL 332451, at *4-5. This
article only discusses her disparate treatment argument.

No. 94-200, tit. I1, 89 Stat. 1124, 1125 (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2810 (1994 & Supp. III
1997)). For a fuller discussion of the applicability of
the HMDA to mortgage lending discrimination, see
generally Boehmer,supra note 4, at 615-17.
132 Generally, small lenders are exempt from the
HMDA reporting requirements. 12 U.S.C. § 2808.
13 The lending institution must make the HMDA
statistical data available for inspection and copying at
the home office and at least one branch office within
the primary metropolitan area. 12 U.S.C. § 2803(a)(1).
134 Dane, supra note 21, at 551 & n.12 (referring
to
Thomas,653 F. Supp. at 1341).

credit extension process cannot be
overestimated. "An appraised value that is less
than the selling price increases the loan-tovalue ratio and either disqualifies the applicant
or increases the required down payment."' 35
The history of racial discrimination in
appraisals dates back to the 1930's at which

time "the federal government became active in
the residential mortgage market." 136 At that
time, "it embraced and nationalized racially
discriminatory home mortgage underwriting
As recently as 1977, The
criteria."' 37
Appraisalof Real Estate, a widely used text,
instructed appraisers to adjust downward the
value of residential property located in a
racially mixed neighborhood.138 Further,"[tihe
'principal [sic] of conformity' categorized
different ethnic groups according to their
detrimental effect upon property values after
'
their 'infiltration' into the neighborhood."139
This practice ceased following the settlement
of United States v. A.LR.E.A., a case brought
against an association of real estate appraisers
by the United States Department of Justice
("DOJ") for "encouraging the practice of
taking racial make-up of neighborhoods into
account in doing housing appraisals."14
13'

Zina Gefter Greene, Reviewing Loan Files for

Evidence ofDiscrimination, 28 J. MARSHALL L. REV.
351, 356 (1995). In Latimore, for example, "[flor the
type of loan Ms. Latimore was seeking, Citibank's
lending criteria required a loan-to-value ratio of, at
most, 75 percent." Latimore, 979 F. Supp. at 663.
236 Dane, supranote 21, at 528.
137 Id. For a complete discussion of the history of
discrimination in residential appraisals and lending, see
Dane, supra note 21, at 533-38 and accompanying
references.
' Hanson v. Veteran's Admin., 800 F.2d 1381, 1387
(5th Cir. 1986).
139Id.

Introduction to Mortgage
140 Robert G. Schwennm,
Lending DiscriminationLaw, 28 J. MARSHALL L. REv.
317, 319 & nn. 11, 12 (1995) (discussing United States
v. A.I.R.E.A., 442 F. Supp. 1072 (N.D. Ill. 1977)).
A.I.R.E.A. agreed to adopt policies prohibiting taking
into account "race, color, religion, sex or national

Generally, residential market value is
calculated using the "market approach."'' An
appraiser using the market approach locates
existing homes recently sold which are
substantially similar to the property being
appraised. 142 The comparable sale prices
provide the starting point from which the
appraiser adjusts the calculation of the target
property.143 The calculation is adjusted based
on "differences between the comparable [sale]" properties and the subject property
being appraised.'" One piece of relevant
market-value data is expressly ignored in the
market-approach appraisal process: the
agreed-upon selling price. 145
If the appraisal is too low to support
the applied-for mortgage based on the lender's
loan-to-value ratio, the seller in the residential
transaction has two choices: (1) he can accept
his buyer's lower offer, that is, conform the
contractual sale price to the amount the bank
will lend based on the under-appraisal, or (2)
he can reject a lower price and commence his
146
search for a new buyer.

origin" when reaching "conclusion[s] or opinion[s] of
value" of property. A.IR.E.A., 442 F. Supp. at 1077.
M4David B. Soleymani, The New York Assessment
Anomaly: Valuation Following Condominium
Conversion, 1987 COLUMBIA Bus. L. REv. 733, 735
(1987). The income approach and cost approach are the
alternative appraisal methods, with the income
approach generally utilized in valuing businesses and
the cost approach applied to value new buildings. Id.
"4 Cartwright v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 880
F.2d 912, 914 & n.4 (7th Cir. 1989). See also
Hanson v. Veterans Admin., 800 F.2d 1381, 1383
(5th Cir. 1986); Steptoe, 800 F. Supp. at 1544 & n.3.
"I Hanson, 800 F.2d at 1383.
144

Id.

145Id.

146 Steptoe, 800 F. Supp. at 1546. "The prospective
purchaser/borrower, faced with an appraisal that will
not support his loan request, is faced with two choices:
(1) hope that he can renegotiate the purchase price to
conform with the lowballed appraisal, or (2) withdraw
his loan application as to that particular piece of
property." Id.

When a seller selects option one, a sale
is concluded for less than the originally
agreed-upon selling price, or the marketproduced price. Arguably, this lower sale
price will become one of the "comparables"
that justify a low appraisal on the next
residential property sold in that neighborhood.
"Discriminatory appraisal may effectively
prevent blacks from purchasing or selling a
home for its fair market value."' 47 Plaintiffs
have argued that, over time, "property values
...continue to be artificially restrained from
rising to the rate at which they would
otherwise rise ifleft to the operation of normal
market forces, in contrast to the property
values in comparable white neighborhoods." 48
'
Low appraisals may indicate a
mortgage lender's intent to redline an area.
Within the mortgage lending industry, the
term "under-appraisal" refers to an appraisal
estimate that is lower than the price agreedupon by a prospective purchaser. 149Applicants
denied home mortgage loans due to an underappraisal of the property they desire to
purchase may only file a claim under the
FHA. 15 0 Appraisers do not fall within the
provisions of the ECOA, since the Act only
prohibits discriminatory acts by "creditors."''
Hanson v. VeteransAdministration152 typifies
the difficulties inherent in proving allegations
of redlining and under-appraisal in home
mortgage lending. The plaintiffs were all
parties who owned or sought to buy property
"in the MacGregor subdivision, a
predominately black, middle class
neighborhood."' 53 In each instance, owners of

MacGregor residences entered into
agreements to sell with prospective
purchasers.' 54 Subsequent Veterans
Administration ("VA")
under-appraisals
"caused many ofthe prospective purchasers to
reduce their offers or look elsewhere for a
home where a 100% VA loan was
available."' 5 5 The plaintiffs utilized both
disparate treatment and disparate impact
analysis to support their claims that "the
application ofracially discriminatory appraisal
practices by the VA" appraisers resulted in
under-appraisals of their residential
56
properties.
Complainants sought to establish their
prima facie case of disparate treatment by
producing evidence that the Veterans
Administration's appraisers were trained to
conduct appraisals according to the "principle
of conformity"' 157 and "continued to apply it"
15 8
in appraising the MacGregor property.
"[S]everal VA appraisal reports concerning
MacGregor property referred to 'economic
depreciation,' 'changes in the neighborhood'
and 'lack of pride of ownership,' all of which
[plaintiffs'] experts testified indicated racial
considerations."'5 9 The VA countered with
five local appraisers who testified that those
phrases were free of racial connotation, and
the district court found the testimony of the
VA's witnesses to be more credible. 160 The
appellate court reviewed the district court's
finding and held it was not clearly
erroneous.' 6 ' Finally, the Hanson plaintiffs
unsuccessfully argued that numerous errors in
the VA appraisals, "all of which tended to
justify lower appraisal," combined to "create

1 Hanson, 800 F.2d at 1386.
'

48
49

1

Id..at 1387 n.7 (quoting appellants' argument).
Id. at 1383.

15042 U.S.C. § 3605(b)(2) (1994) (prohibiting

discriminatory appraisals).
' See infra note 74 for a definition of "creditors"
under the ECOA.
152800 F.2d 1381 (5th Cir. 1986).
153Id.at 1383.

154 Id.
15sId. at
15 6 Id. at

1383 & n.4.
1384.
57
1 Id. at 1387.
158 Id.

Id.

159

'60 Id. at
161Id.

1388.

an inference of racial bias."162 The Fifth
Circuit upheld the district court's
characterization of these mistakes as
"independent instances of human error."' 63

A low appraisal. Endless
for more
requests
documentation and paperwork.
Unexplained loan processing
delays. Failure to return phone
calls promptly. Unequal
treatment. Discourtesy. Bait
and switch. Failure to provide
a loan application form.
Refusal to put loan details in
writing. Approval for less than
the loan amount requested. 66

VI. CONCLUSION
The rollback of affirmative action
gains in the contexts of government
contracting and higher education"M has
deservedly seized the attention of civil rights
activists in the 1990's. Yet mortgage lending
discrimination remains one of the principal
civil rights issues limiting the ability of
creditworthy black citizens to move into
society's middle-class.165 Federal fair housing
and lending statutes continue to have little
impact on statistics indicating a wide disparity
in the approval rates of black and white credit
applicants.
When the FHA and ECOA were
enacted, racial discrimination often resulted
from overtly discriminatory housing practices.
Contemporary mortgage lending
discrimination generally is subtle. A reporter
for the Orlando Sentinel recently provided a
list of tactics employed by racially
discriminatory creditors:
62

1 1d.
163

Hanson, 800 F.2d at 1388.

164

See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S.

200 (1995) (addressing the legality of minority setasides in the distribution of government contracts);
Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996)
(holding that the University of Texas School of Law
violated the Fourteenth Amendment by giving racial
preferences in its admissions process to minority

applicants).
16' Evans v. First Fed. Say. Bank, 669 F. Supp. 915,
920 (N.D. Ind. 1987). "The financial and tax benefits
that result from the purchase of a home, including the
eventual accural [sic] of equity, make home ownership

an attractive investment for those who can afford it.
Using the equity in one's already-owned home as
collateral for a loan is a valued and common practice in
this country and, as such, is a significant interest
associated with home ownership." Id.

These practices allow creditors to avoid
making home loans to qualified applicants
without actually rej ecting their applications. 167
Further, significant discrepancies in
the rejection rates of minority and white
mortgage applications remain.1 68 Based on a
survey of 14.8 million loan applications from
1996, the Federal Financial Institutions
169
Examination Council ("the Council")
reported that "48.8 percent ofblack applicants
were denied their loan applications, while
only 24.1 percent of white applicants were
denied." 171 While the approval rate for loans
increased for all groups, loans to blacks
increased only 3.1 percent. 71 Home Mortgage
Disclosure Act data for the previous two years
showed a decline in conventional home

Robert Bruss,

166

How to Spot Mortgage

Discrimination,ORLANDO SENTINEL, January 17,1999.
167

Id.

supra note 4, at 604.
"The Council is a consortium of five federal

163 Boehmer,
169

financial groups." See infrt note 170.
Thin
Red
America's
170

Line,

http://more.abcnews.go.com/sections/us/loans805lnd
ex.html (January 7, 1999).
171Id. "At the same time, the overall approval rate for
loans for all groups increased, with lending to
Hispanics up 13.4 percent; Native Americans loans up
11.4 percent; loans to Asians up 8.2 percent; loans to
whites up 8.1 percent." Id.

mortgage lending to black consumers. 72 At
the same time, FHA lending to blacks has
shown a substantial increase, "more than
offset[ting] the decline in conventional
1 73
lending.'
OnNovember 24, 1998, officials at the
National Community Reinvestment Coalition
('NCRC") "released a study indicating that
"the gap between minorities and whites being
denied home mortgages widened
[between] 1996 and 1997.'i 174 Further, much
of the new lending to black consumers has
consisted of subprime loans, where the
interest rate "can run from over 8 percent to as
high as 15 percent."' 75
Comparable
conventional home mortgage rates are "6.5
percent to 7 percent."176 Fully "19 percent of
all single-family home loans to blacks" were
subprime loans. 177 In contrast, only "6.9
percent of loans to whites and 8.6 percent [of
178
loans] to Hispanics" were subprime loans.
Professor Robert Boehmer of the
University of Georgia suggests that:
When this long-standing
prohibition of mortgage
discrimination is viewed
alongside a continued pattern
of racial disparity in loan
approval rates, the conclusion
is compelled that it is time for
anew approach. This approach
172 Examiners

Watching for FHA Loan Steering,

NATIONAL MORTGAGE NEws,
173 Id.

Nov. 19, 1998.

"7Study FindsBlacks PayingPremiumfor Mortgages
National Community Reinvestment Coalition Sees
Wider Gap Between Minorities, Whites on Home
Loans, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESs-NEws, Nov. 25, 1998.

should not water down the
existing law but should
recognize that, to the extent
the law is so complex that it
cannot be readily understood
by those regulated, it is more
likely to foster litigation than
to achieve its goals. This fresh
approach should further
recognize that to the extent
that a law contains
inconsistencies
and
unnecessarily burdensome
regulatory requirements, those
regulated are less likely to
79
comply voluntarily. 1
The current ambiguity as to whether
Title VII standards are imported into the
mortgage discrimination lending context
creates much of the inconsistency to which
Professor Boehmer refers. Congress must take
immediate action to eliminate this
inconsistency and encourage private
enforcement of the existing statutory
prohibitions against redlining. Further, civil
rights advocates should press for codification
of the relationship between fair lending and
employment discrimination case law. Finally,
clarification could be obtained if the Supreme
Court were to grant certiorari and hear an
appeal as to mortgage lending discrimination.
Doing so would provide the Court with an
opportunity to establish binding precedent as
to the application of employment
discrimination standards to mortgage lending
discrimination litigation.
Both Latimore's and Citibank's counsel
presented their cases within the framework of

The Coalition analyzed data submitted by banks, thrifts
and mortgage companies to the federal government. Id.
175 Id.

176 Id.
177Id. The

data includes mortgages, refmancings and
home improvement loans.
178 Id.

Boehmer, supra note 4, at 604 (citations omitted).
The "new approach" Boehmer recommends combines
a reduction in the regulatorily required paperwork with
179

"vigorous enforcement" and community reinvestment
incentives. Id. at 605.

McDonnell Douglas. The Latimore decision
raises doubts about the future viability of
private mortgage lending discrimination
claims. Congress must provide certainty to all
parties to these lawsuits -- mortgage loan

applicants, lending institutions, fair housing
advocacy groups, plaintiffs' and defendants'

counsel -- that Title VII law is applicable to
mortgage lending discrimination claims.
Otherwise, the long-term result of Latimore
may well be an increasing reluctance on the
part ofplaintiffs' bar to take clients who allege
mortgage lending discrimination.

